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S.D. New York
Shea v Long Island Railroad Co. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Diane Diana   
Thursday, 13 August 2009 08:17
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Case Name: Andrew Shea v Long Island Railroad Co.
Date: 21st May 2009
Court: U.S.D.C. - S.D. New York
Judge: District Judge Stanton
Citation: 2009 WL 1424115 (S.D.N.Y.)

Background: Plaintiff Andrew Shea sued under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") for alleged physical and psychological injuries sustained in an accident at work.

Plaintiff moved in limine under Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to exclude testimony of defendant Long Island Railroad Company’s experts. Those experts included psychologist Richard Vickers, and psychiatrist William Head.

Plaintiff sought to preclude Dr. Vickers and Dr. Head from testifying in reliance upon or referring to the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (“MMPI-2”) which Dr. Vickers administered to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff argued that Dr. Vickers did not reliably interpret his MMPI-2 results, and therefore Dr. Head in turn should not be allowed to rely on Dr. Vickers’s report on the MMPI-2.

Issue: Whether the plaintiff's motion in limine to preclude testimony from Dr. Vickers and Dr. Head will be granted.

Held:
The crux of the plaintiff’s objection against Dr. Vickers was that he failed to apply the principles and methods reliably to his case. He contended Dr. Vickers “cherry picked” which interpretation he wanted, and failed to consider alternative explanations.

Dr. Vickers argued that he considered and ruled out each of the plaintiff’s alternative interpretations of the MMPI-2 results, using his professional judgment and cited authorities in his field. Dr. Vickers’s opinions based on Mr. Shea’s MMPI-2 results were reliable and followed the approach other clinicians in his field have. Thus, the motion in limine to preclude Dr. Vickers’s testimony regarding the MMPI-2 is denied.

Comments:

An expert witness or professional witness is someone, who because of education, training, skill, or experience, is believed to have knowledge in a particular subject beyond that of the average person.

Experts charge a professional fee which is paid by the party commissioning the report. The fee must not be contingent on the outcome of the case. Expert witnesses must be subpoenaed, although it is merely a formality.

Steve Gordon
http://www.gordon-elias.com


Last Updated on Wednesday, 14 October 2009 08:14
 
James Siegel v Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Diane Diana   
Tuesday, 04 August 2009 12:36
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Case Name: James Siegel v Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co.
Date of Judgment: 1st April 2009
Court: U.S.D.C. – S.D. New York
Judge: District Judge Chin
Citation: 2009 WL 889985 (S.D.N.Y.)

Background:
Plaintiff, James Siegel, worked for defendant, Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. (“Metro-North”) from 1978 until his retirement in 2008. Siegel was most recently a signalman.

In either 2004 or 2005, Siegel began experiencing pain in his wrists and hands. He went to see an orthopedist, who diagnosed him with carpal tunnel syndrome (“CTS”). Eventually he had surgery. On October 11, 2005, Siegel injured his back while lifting a heavy piece of equipment. His back injury required Siegel to go to physical therapy.

Siegel filed suit and amended his complaint six months later. Metro-North brought a motion for summary judgment only as to Siegel’s CTS claim. They argued that no reasonable jury could find that Siegel’s CTS was caused by working for Metro-North.

Issue: Whether the Court will grant summary judgment for Metro-North.

Held:
Siegel failed to prove that his CTS was caused by his work for Metro-North. None of the evidence introduced was sufficient to meet Siegel’s burden of proof as to causation.

Siegel submitted numerous publications to the Court discussing CTS generally. This general evidence did not specifically address Siegel, his workplace, or the types of activities he did at work.

The Court also noted that Siegel did not submit an affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. There was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Metro-North caused Siegel’s CTS. Therefore, Metro-North’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Comments:

In a motion for summary judgment, the judge has to decide what the facts are and apply the law. When a motion is granted, the lawsuit stops and does not proceed to trial. Conversely, when a motion is denied, the lawsuit moves to trial. At trial each party has the opportunity to give their side to a judge or jury.

The party moving for summary judgment must prove that there are no material issues of act remaining to be tried. If there’s nothing for the jury to decide, then the moving party rhetorically asks, why have a trial? However, when a party moves for summary judgment, the judge may find that it is the other party who is entitled to judgment.

Steve Gordon
http://www.gordon-elias.com


Last Updated on Wednesday, 14 October 2009 08:16
 
Steve D. Sharpley v Metro-North Commuter Railroad PDF Print E-mail
Written by Diane Diana   
Friday, 31 July 2009 09:33
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Case Name : Steve D. Sharpley v Metro-North Commuter Railroad
Date of Judgment
: 27th March 2009
Court
: U.S.D.C. - S.D. New York
Judge:
District Judge Daniels
Citation
: 2009 WL 855790 (S.D.N.Y.)

Background:
Plaintiff, Steve Sharpley, was a former signal inspector employed by defendant, Metro-North Commuter Railroad (“Metro North”). Sharpley filed suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”) to recover damages for injuries sustained as a result of his employer’s negligence in maintaining its premises.

Sharpley presented evidence at trial that as he was stepping down out of his employer’s truck, he placed his foot upon a heightened portion of the ground. The ground was wet from a recent snowfall and shifted under Shipley’s weight. He grabbed the steering wheel, attempting to regain his composure. He felt a pop in his back and wrenched his lower back.


Sharpley blamed the darkened conditions at the work site for his inability to see the heightened portion of ground. The trial evidence demonstrated Metro-North had previously received complaints about the inadequate lighting. Other evidence showed that Metro-North had provided Sharpley with a flashlight, which he failed to use when he alighted from the vehicle.

After a four-day jury trial, judgment was found in favor of Sharpley, who was awarded $832,403 in damages. Metro-North moved for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial. Metro-North contended that the jury’s failure to find contributory negligence as well as its excessive award were against the weight of evidence and constituted a miscarriage of justice.


Sharpley’s Issue:
Sharpley argued that Metro-North maintained an unsafe workplace by failing to install overhead lighting.

Metro-North’s Issue: The defense counsel stressed to the jury that the issue of lighting was irrelevant. They contended the cause of the accident was Sharpley’s failure to properly secure his footing and not slip.

Held:

The Court concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Sharpley suffered an injury solely as a result of Metro-North’s negligence in failing to provide permanent lighting fixtures.

Moreover, Metro-North’s position that the verdict must be set aside, because the jury ignored evidence that Sharpley caused the accident, stood in stark contrast to their closing arguments. There they stated the lighting conditions did not play a role in causing the accident. The jury reasonably concluded that Sharpley was unable to use a flashlight while at the same time lowering himself to the ground. Thus, the jury found that Metro-North had failed to meet its burden of proving that Sharpley was contributorily negligent. The jury’s finding that Metro-North had failed to meet its burden of proving that Sharpley was contributorily negligent was neither an error nor a miscarriage of justice.


The Court further held there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s award. The award was consistent with evidence of Sharpley’s physical limitations caused by his back injury.


Comments:

The Court focused on what was the sole cause of Sharpley’s injury. Often a Court will find there are multiple causes of injuries. To resolve this, courts will look to the sole or primary cause of the accident. Here, the flashlight was not the sole cause of the accident. It was the lack of permanent lighting which caused the fall. It is debatable whether the flashlight would have been useful or practical as Metro-North argued. There was no debate about the need for permanent lighting, a fact that Metro-North was already aware of due to prior accidents. Thus, a flashlight would be no alternative to a permanent light fixture.

Steve Gordon

Last Updated on Wednesday, 14 October 2009 08:18
 


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