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Brian Wright v Arkansas & Missouri Railroad Company PDF Print E-mail
Written by Steve Gordon   
Wednesday, 16 September 2009 22:54
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Case Name: Brian Wright v Arkansas & Missouri Railroad Company
Date Decided: July 29, 2009
Judge: Judge Smith
Court: United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Citation: 574 F.3d 612

Background:
Brian Wright (“Wright”), a railroad employee brought this action pursuant to the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (“FELA”) and the Locomotive Inspection Act (“LIA”).

The U.S.D.C. for the Western District of Arkansas granted summary judgment on the LIA claim. A jury rendered a favorable verdict for Wright on the FELA claim.

 

 

On November 11, 2005, Wright was employed by AMR as a trainee for the position of brakeman/conductor. Wright arrived to the rail yard shortly before 7am while it was dark outside. Wright began preparing for a run on AMR’s locomotive with two other employees.

Wright climbed onto the locomotive to put up his bags and as he was coming back down the ladder of the locomotive, he slipped on an oil-covered step, fell, and injured his shoulder.

The locomotive was on “repair in place” at the time of the accident. Another employee had inspected the locomotive and checked the steps and walkways for grease and oil.

On the day of the accident, Wright was treated for his injuries at a clinic. Wright received continued care and was placed on light duty.

After a jury trial Wright recovered $55k in damages and Wright appealed.

Wright appealed claiming three prejudicial errors (1) the district court applied different standards for proximate causation when it submitted the parties’ theories of negligence and contributory negligence (2) the district court admitted irrelevant evidence solely designed to prejudice Wright and (3) the district court erred by holding the LI did not apply.

Issue:
Was Wright successful on appeal?

Held:
Wright argued that the district court erred in applying different proximate cause standards for negligence and contributory negligence when it submitted the jury instructions. More specifically, Wright argued that the district court erred by applying a lighter burden for proximate causation for AMR’S allegation of contributory negligence than for his allegation of negligence.

Wright asserted that the jury should have been instructed that AMR’s failure to warn Wright not to board the train was a potential cause of Wright’s injuries.

This Court found that the instruction given in the jury did not negate AMR’s duty to reasonably foresee unsafe working conditions. The jury instruction required the jury to find that the first element of negligence was met if AMR “failed to provide reasonable safe conditions for work”. Thus, it was not prejudicial.

Second, Wright also argued that the district court erred by admitting evidence that AMR terminated Wright after his injuries, AMR found Wright at a casino after he left work and (3) prior to the accident, Wright had been disciplined for missing work due to illness without calling a supervisor.

Wright argued that the evidence regarding his termination was irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible and argued that it was prejudicial because it suggested his lost wages resulted from his termination and not his injuries. The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the evidence but also recognized that the district court did not admit the evidence to deny future earnings under FELA beyond termination date. Rather the evidence was introduced to rebut the impression left by Wright’s own testimony.

Wright also contended that the district court abused its discretion in allowing evidence that he went to a casino after leaving work early and that he previously missed work without calling a supervisor.  Wright argued that evidence of other crimes or wrongs is inadmissible unless relevant to a material issue other than the character of a party. However, because this evidence could bear on Wright’s credibility based upon his testimony that he left work early because of illness.

Finally, Wright argued that the LIA should apply because it was “in use” as shown by its preparation for imminent departure.

However, the Court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the LIA issue. The Court examining the statute explained that Congress excluded injuries “directly resulting from the inspection, repair, or servicing of railroad equipment located at a maintenance facility”.

Accordingly this Court affirmed the rulings of the District Court.

Comment:

When a Court of Appeals rules on the admission or exclusion of evidence of a lower court, it does so on an abuse of discretion standard. The discretion of a trial court to admit evidence is given great deference and only clear errors of law or fact will reverse the lower court’s findings.

Also, the Locomotive Inspection Act, applies only to locomotives that are “in use” at the time of the injury. Those that are not in use do not fall within the purview of the LIA.

Steve Gordon
http://www.Gordon-Elias.com

Last Updated on Tuesday, 13 October 2009 11:34
 
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