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E.D. California
Jeff Nickles v Union Pacific Railroad Co. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Diane Diana   
Friday, 07 August 2009 09:25
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Case Name: Jeff Nickles v Union Pacific Railroad Company    
Date Decided: July 27, 2009   
Court: U.S.D.C. Eastern District of California
Citation: 2009 WL 2242433 (E.D.Cal.)

Background:
Plaintiff, Jeff Nickles, (“Nickles”) filed an action seeking to recover for injuries suffered as a result of the derailment of rail grinding track maintenance equipment, owned and operated by Harsco Track Technologies (“Harsco”). Nickles moves for summary judgment on the issue whether he, an employee for Harasco, was also a borrowed servant under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (“FELA”).

Issue: Did the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, whether he was a borrowed servant to UP and thus able to collect damages under FELA for injuries sustained while working as a contractor for defendant?

Held:
The Court will only grant a motion for summary judgment if, based upon the evidence presented, there are no genuine issues of material fact.

Nickles claims as an employee of Harsco, contacted to work on UP’s railroad, than he is an “employee” as defined under FELA. Nickles introduced evidence showing that the Harsco equipment was under the direct supervision of UP employees while it was being used.

Case law under FELA has established that each case must be decided on its particular facts and that there is no special sense or definition of “employee” or “employed”.

Therefore, because the issue of “employed” or “employee” is so factually driven under FELA, this Court denied plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue whether he was considered a “servant” and thus, covered under FELA.

Comment:
Under FELA only employees or those employed by the railroad company may sue for injuries occurred “while employed”. Here, the plaintiff worked as a subcontractor for UP and used equipment upon the direction of UP’s supervisors. As such, plaintiff contended that he was clearly employed by UP and therefore able to sue under FELA.

However, the Court held that the definition of employee or employed by was so factually driven by each special circumstances of the case it was inappropriate to hold there were no genuine issues of material fact.

Steve Gordon
http://www.gordon-elias.com

 

 

Last Updated on Tuesday, 13 October 2009 13:02
 
Ronald Anderson v Union Pacific Railroad Co. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Diane Diana   
Tuesday, 04 August 2009 08:46
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Case Name: Ronald Anderson v Union Pacific Railroad Co.
Date of Judgment: 27th September 2002
Court: U.S.D.C. – E.D. California
Judge: District Judge Levi
Citation: 2002 WL 34482622 (E.D.Cal.)

Background: Plaintiff, Ronald Anderson, brought suit against defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company (“Union Pacific”). Anderson was injured while working as an engineer for Union Pacific.

Anderson moved for summary judgment on the railroad’s liability and all of Union Pacific’s affirmative defenses. Anderson further contended that Union Pacific violated the California Public Utilities Commission General Order 26-D (“GO 26-D”) and that such violation constituted negligence per se under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”).

Issue: Whether the Court will grant summary judgment to Anderson.

Held:
Anderson’s motion for summary judgment will be denied without prejudice. There is disagreement in the case law as to whether a violation of a state regulation, here the GO 26-D, can constitute negligence per se under FELA.

Anderson cited Whitley v Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 902 P.2d 1196 (Or.1995), where a state regulation established negligence per se.

However, Union Pacific cited to Schultz v Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 2002 WL 1227222 (Ill.2002), as well as Haugen v Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co., 2001 WL 1852331 (W.D.Wash.2001) to show that a state regulation could not establish negligence per se under FELA.

This Court held that further briefing on the issue, as well as the cases of Whitley, Schultz, and Haugen were needed before a decision can be made. Therefore, the Court will permit further briefing on whether a state regulation can constitute negligence per se under FELA.

Comments:

This case represents a ruling that is not often given: a motion for summary judgment that is denied without prejudice.

When a motion is dismissed without prejudice, it indicates the absence of a decision on the merits. This leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action, as though the dismissed action had never happened.

The purpose of the Court ruling without prejudice on Anderson’s motion was to prohibit Union Pacific from using the doctrine of res judicata in a later action. Res judicata occurs when a court has already decided a case, and as a result, no new lawsuits may be brought on that subject.

Steve Gordon
http://www.gordon-elias.com


Last Updated on Tuesday, 13 October 2009 13:05
 


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